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CASE STUDY 6 
The Sulzer Hip 
Replacement Recall Crisis 
A Patient's Perspective 
Keri K. Stephens, Scott C. D'Urso, and Penny Holmes 
This case discusses a product recall that resulted from a manufacturing 
defect and the degree to which the company distributed accurate and 
timely information to affected patients. More specifically, the case exam-
ines the crisis communication of Sulzer Orthopedics and its efforts to 
negotiate the interests of various stakeholders, while limiting liability. 
Written from the perspective of a patient, the case raises interesting ques-
tions regarding organizational duties related to product liability. It also 
provides valuable insights into how organizational communication may 
have both short- and long-term effects on its relationship with patients 
and physicians, among others. 
Organizations can find themselves in ethical dilemmas when 
unexpected problems occur. Product recalls resulting from 
manufacturing defects are one of those unexpected situations because 
companies need to decide when to announce the recall, how to distrib-
ute information, and whether they will compensate those affected 
adversely. One major challenge that companies face when they need to 
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recall a product is how to remedy the situation without exposing them-
selves to extensive financial liability. If they say the wrong things, the 
crisis can bankrupt them. 
Companies that manufacture medical products have a particularly 
difficult dilemma during a crisis. Typically, they have many constituent 
groups-stakeholders-that they need to simultaneously please. As they 
communicate to diverse groups such as patients, doctors, the public, 
and the Food and Drug Administration, the actual words they use can 
matter substantially. In the case that follows, Sulzer Orthopedics, a 
medical device manufacturer, is faced with the dilemma of how and 
when to tell their various stakeholders that one of their products, an 
artificial hip, was contaminated during production. This is particularly 
sensitive because this recalled product was surgically implanted inside 
of people and now requires additional surgery to remove it. 
Whereas many organizational ethical issues are explored from the 
organization's viewpoint, this case includes the voice of Tom, a patient 
experiencing complications after both of his hips were replaced. Here, 
we provide his perspective to show the severity of the recall situation, 
and the ramifications of poorly executed communication decisions. In 
Tom's efforts to seek information about the recall, he relies heavily 
on the Internet because Sulzer chooses to avoid direct communication 
with the affected victims. By accessing the Internet, Tom realizes that 
Sulzer is telling different stories to its various stakeholders, likely for 
legal reasons. The case that follows is presented in two parts: (a) a 
historical description of a product recall that resulted in the initial 
communicative response of Sulzer Orthopedics, and (b) the continued 
development of the case including latter communicative responses by 
Sulzer Orthopedics . 
• :. PART 1: WE WILL TAKE CARE OF YOU 
Christmas 2000 
It was not a very merry Christmas for the Taylorl family. Tom, a for-
merly physically active man in his mid-50s, was in constant pain. He 
was unable to ride in a car and he had to sleep upright in a lounge 
chair. In April of 2000, Tom had both of his hips replaced and, after 
rapid improvement through the first six to eight weeks of physical 
therapy, he hit a wall in his recovery. Despite his continual efforts to 
seek assistance at orthopedic and pain management centers in his city, 
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he was making no progress. His surgeon treated him as if his problems 
were all in his head and offered him and his family little support. Then, 
on Christmas Eve, eight months after his surgery, Tom's surgeon called 
him at home to notify him that his hip replacements were being 
recalled. 
Analysis of Product Failure 
In October of 1999, after a manufacturing review, Sulzer began pro-
ducing a new lot of artificial hips. Almost a year later, in July of 2000, 
complaints began to surface from surgeons who were reporting that 
some of their patients were having problems during rehabilitation. , 
After these cases mounted, Sulzer began an investigation to see if there' 
were any abnormalities that could be associated with their product. 
As part of this investigation, Sulzer hired North American Science 
Associates (NAMSA), an outside firm specializing in nonclinical fine 
testing services to ensure medical device safety and compliance, to test 
the hips in question. In mid-November, NAMSA reported back to the 
company that during their tests, they had discovered an oily residue 
present on the surface of the hip socket portion of the device. They 
believed that this residue could prevent the device from properly attach-
ing to the patient's existing bone. Approximately three weeks later, 
Sulzer's parent company, Sulzer AG of Europe, announced through an 
overseas press release that they were voluntarily recalling the affected 
hip product, which included some 40,000 units. Three days later, they 
officially notified the u.s. Food and Drug Administration of the recall. 
On December 7, 2000, Sulzer notified all the surgeons who had per-
formed hip replacement surgeries using their products. This notifica-
tion is what the FDA currently requires. Sulzer gave the physicians 
copies of a suggested letter template that they could use to contact all 
their patients directly. 
To best understand the ramifications of this recall, it is helpful to 
understand the complex nature of the surgery involved. The surgery 
involves removing a portion of the upper leg bone that includes the 
ball section of the hip joint. This is replaced by one portion of the arti-
ficial hip. In addition, part of the patient's hipbone is graded away in 
order to implant the hip shell, or socket portion. This section has a 
semi-porous side that comes into contact with the bone. In normal sit-
uations, the bone will grow into these pores, forming a strong bond 
with the implant. 
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Most patients who received the hip implant, like Tom, did well at the 
outset of the procedure; however, within a few weeks some patients 
began noticing problems. Sulzer describes the problems in their recall 
letter to surgeons (G. Sabins et al., personal communication, December 7, 
2000): 
4-6 Weeks: Patient progressing well or reporting groin or 
anterior pain. 
Up to 6 Weeks: Observe increased groin pain 
Patient has significant startup pain with rising from a seated 
position, may have buttock pain. 
X-Ray evaluation may show component migration 
6 Weeks to 3 Months: Significant pain with weight bearing, 
may require cane or crutch. 
Patient cannot exert resistance in leg movement tests. 
3 Months +: X-rays may reveal a slight separation between 
the implant and the bone and may show some component 
movement. 
In short, because of the residue found on the porous portion of the 
hip shell, the hipbone could not properly bond. In some cases, this led 
to poor attachment and, in more dramatic instances, it produced com-
plete hip failure. 
Sulzer's Position 
Sulzer Orthopedics, the fourth-largest supplier of orthopedic 
implants in the world at the time of the recall, was often seen as the 
premier manufacturer in this industry. As of 2002, between 150,000 
and 200,000 hip replacements were being performed each year (Hip 
Replacement Surgery, 2002) and Sulzer was particularly well known 
for their hip and knee replacement devices. 
The hip replacement recall can be considered a crisis for Sulzer. 
Fink (1986) defines an organizational crisis as a situation that can 
potentially escalate in intensity, fall under close government or media 
scrutiny, jeopardize the current positive public image of an organiza-
tion, or interfere with normal business operations, including damaging 
the bottom line in any way. According to Pearson and Mitroff (1993), 
crises are composed of five dimensions: 1) high visibility, 2) immediate 
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attention is required, 3) surprise is a common part of the crisis, 4) action 
is needed, and 5) control is not always possible. Sulzer's crisis fits all 
five of these dimensions. 
In Sulzer's situation, they quickly found themselves needing to 
contain the damage being caused by the tragic product contamination. 
This phase, called damage containment, is common to nearly all crises 
(Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). The purpose of damage containment is to 
prevent the crisis from contaminating other parts of the organization or 
environment not immediately affected. During this crisis phase, orga-
nizations seek to protect their image by modifying public perception of 
responsibility for the crisis or to manage the public'S impression of the 
organization in crisis (Coombs, 1999). 
When the recall was made public, Sulzer began to contain the dam-
age by initially issuing a statement to the press that they would cover all 
medical expenses and lost wages resulting from the defective implants. 
"It was our fault," said Sulzer's Steven Whitlock in February of 2001 
(Roser & Park, 2001). In an open letter to surgeons published in several 
central Texas newspapers, Sulzer pledged openness and restitution for 
the patients who received defective implants. In the crisis communica-
tion literature, how an organization responds to a crisis is called a 
message strategy and Coombs (1999) has developed a comprehensive 
typology describing these strategies. In this phase of the crisis, Sulzer 
consistently used a message strategy known as remediation, since they 
accepted blame and offered to correct the damage their implants caused. 
Tom's Second Surgery 
Considering the previous lack of support from his surgeon, Tom 
had no desire to continue the relationship with the surgeon that had 
performed his first hip replacement surgery. He and his wife began 
searching the Internet to find surgeons that specialized in the removal 
and replacement of these defective parts. They found a surgeon in 
Houston and scheduled the first available appointment. 
The specialist worked exclusively with joint replacements of this 
type and had had years of prior experience using Sulzer products. The 
specialist assured them that Sulzer was a solid company that would 
take care of its customers, so they rescheduled the second hip replace-
ment surgery. Since Sulzer made the "Cadillac" of hip replacements, 
the specialist recommended that they replace the defective parts with 
new Sulzer parts. Tom agreed and wanted both hips replaced at once; 
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however, the specialist explained that a second hip replacement 
surgery was much more serious and he recommended doing two surg-
eries, to replace each hip separately. By May of 2001, both of the defec-
tive hips had been removed and replaced with new materials. The 
rehabilitation began for the second time. 
The surgeons are in a unique position during a medical recall. 
Usually, they are responsible for making the selection of the medical 
device, such as the artificial hip, and the patient has no input. 
Essentially, the surgeon has the direct relationship with Sulzer. When 
we talk about direct and indirect relationships between communica-
tion parties, it is useful to look at stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984). 
This theory defines a stakeholder as any group or public impacted 
by the organization's operation. Wolfe and Putler (2002) explain, 
"the purpose of stakeholder management is to facilitate our under-
standing of increasingly unpredictable external environments, 
thereby facilitating our ability to manage within these environments" 
(p. 64). But in addition to the managerial concerns of stakeholder 
theory, it can also be used to expand the ethical considerations 
of organizations to actively include the voice of their stakeholders 
(Deetz, 2001). As these definitions suggest, stakeholder theory pro-
vides a solid way to ground an understanding of health-related crisis 
communication. 
The relationships with stakeholder groups are often quite 
dynamic, especially during a crisis. Botan and So to (1998) explain 
that the relationship with the public stakeholder group can be defined 
by its longitudinal nature and the relationship complexity. Strategic 
communication campaigns "are characterized by their intended role 
in positioning an organization or group to negotiate relationships 
with relevant environmental forces" (p. 23). One way to think of 
stakeholder relationships is using a framework of coalitional rela-
tionships (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In coalitional relationships, orga-
nizations respond to pressures from the environment, accede to the 
demands of some coaliti0nal interests, avoid th.e demands of others, 
establish relationships with some coalitions, and avoid them with 
others. Shifting stakeholder relationships creates problems for 
organizations because the criteria and expectations may be incom-
patible or competing. Faced with conflicting demands, the organiza-
tion must decide which groups to attend to and which to ignore 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These difficult decisions contributed to the 
complexity of the ethical issues Sulzer faced. 
Case Study 6: The Sulzer Hip Replacement Recall Crisis 131 
.:. PART 2: SULZER AS A "NON-ENTITY" 
IN THE PATIENT'S MINDS 
As of February 2, 2002, nearly 2,800 hundred Sulzer patients had 
undergone surgeries to replace the defective hips. In addition, a 
similar defect was found with Sulzer's knee replacement parts, and an 
additional 560 patients have had surgeries to replace defective knee 
implants. It was still unknown how many more surgeries needed to be 
performed. 
April 2002-What Happened Since Part 17 
It is now several years since Tom's first hip replacement, and one 
year since the second surgeries. Tom is still not completely recovered. 
His wife, Mary, explains, "We have not been able to leave town for two 
years." She further explains that only recently can he travel in a car and 
when he goes to a movie he has to get up and walk around five times. 
Furthermore, he still cannot put on his shoes and socks without her 
help. He had to quit his job shortly after the problems began and every 
day he spends hours at the gym working on his rehabilitation. He is 
also out tens of thousands of dollars for medical expenses that have not 
been reimbursed by Sulzer. Now Tom's hip replacement surgeon has 
adopted a more neutral tone toward Sulzer and no longer suggests that 
Sulzer will take care of these patients. 
Severity of Effects 
While some patients who received the recalled implants have 
shown no signs of problems, there are a significant number who have. 
Some have experienced minor discomfort not requiring surgery, while 
others have had near catastrophic incidences with the defective parts. 
One patient has had to endure the situation twice. "I was told if I had 
this hip replacement, I'd be as good as new," said Rhonda Silva, one of 
15 plaintiffs in a subsequent class action lawsuit filed in San Francisco 
(Bernstein, 2001). "It has ruined my entire life." Silva's first hip failed a 
few weeks after the surgery when the synthetic hip separated from the 
bone, leaving her leg unattached to the rest of her body structure. Her 
doctors recommended another replacement. However, this happened 
before the recall was announced. The second hip came from the same 
batch of flawed hips and the operation failed once again. She is 
.. 
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currently scheduled for a third surgery with a new doctor who has 
been instructed not to use Sulzer equipment. 
Legal Battles 
Almost immediately after the recall announcements, lawsuits were 
filed on behalf of some of the early recipients of the recalled devices, 
and new surgeries were scheduled to replace the defective units. The 
problems for Sulzer continued. In May of 2001, they announced a sec-
ond recall because a similar manufacturing problem had been discov-
ered with the company's artificial knee implant. This recall affected 
nearly 1,500 individuals. 
Sulzer made its first offer to settle the growing number of lawsuits 
related to the first recall in August of 2001. They proposed a settlement 
of $750 million to cover all affected parties. This offer would have given 
each hip replacement patient who had one hip replaced approximately 
$51,500, while patients with two hip replacements would receive about 
$97,000. Most patients rejected the offer outright. 
Just over two weeks after the initial proposed settlement, the first 
court case involving the recalled implants ended in Corpus Christi, 
Texas. There, a jury awarded three women over $15 million dollars, 
saying that Sulzer had acted with "malice" for not informing patients 
and doctors sooner, and for continuing to sell the product while it 
was under investigation. Earlier in this case we mentioned that Sulzer 
waited to report the recall until after they investigated the concerns. 
Sulzer called the decision way out of line ("Sulzer to appeal $15.1M 
verdict," 2001). They believed they had communicated the problem 
appropriately. Within days, Judge Kathleen O'Malley, U.S. district 
judge in Cleveland, Ohio, ordered a halt to all court trials involving the 
recall until the settlement offer from Sulzer was reviewed. 
A few days later, Sulzer scrapped its initial settlement offer and 
proposed a new one. In the revised settlement offer, Sulzer agreed to 
pay $1 billion dollars tp settle the pending lawsuits. This would give 
the average patient an award of approximately $200,000, which would 
cover medical expenses, legal fees, and other expenses. It was Sulzer's 
contention that the problems associated with the recalls were not as 
significant as portrayed in the media. "We are trying to make sure all 
parties are comfortable [with the settlement]," said Harlan Loeb, a 
Sulzer spokesman ("Sulzer Agrees to Negotiated Settlement," 2001). 
Judge O'Malley set a hearing for May 14, 2002, to discuss approval or 
rejection of the class-action settlement offer..\ j 
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Sulzer defends itself in court 
Despite Sulzer's initial acceptance of blame for the recall-a 
remediation message strategy-the company told a different story in 
the courts. Documents filed by Sulzer in March of 2001 indicated that 
the patients and unidentified third parties are at fault for the hip fail-
ures (Roser & Park, 2001). When explaining the crisis in court, they not 
only failed to accept blame, but they also blamed others for the prod-
uct problem. Sulzer spokesperson, M. J. Nicchio, said that the argu-
ments presented are standard in this type of case because they give the 
company every means of defense in a case. However, Ron Weddington, 
a lawyer for one of the plaintiffs, questions this legal move by saying, 
"It's rare that there is such a stark contrast between what they are say-
ing in the newspaper and what they are saying in court" (Roser & Park, 
2001). Not only did they change their message strategy from one of 
accepting blame to blaming others, but Sulzer also refused to identify 
the third parties mentioned in their defense. This raised concerns for 
many of Sulzer's stakeholders. 
During damage containment and recovery, organizations experi-
encing a crisis must decide how to address the concerns of multiple 
individuals and organizations, yet maintain their own legitimacy. 
/ Suchman (1995) describes legitimacy as "a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions" (p. 574). Pearson and Clair (1998) state that the "failure to 
provide consistent information" (p. 72) exacerbates and elongates 
crisis situations. Massey (2001) claims that consistency during a crisis 
response requires that the focal organization provide the same account 
to all stakeholders. In Sulzer's situation, they were inconsistent in 
many areas. Not only did they change their strategy over time, but they 
also used different strategies across stakeholder groups. The problem 
is that with the proliferation of technology, these inconsistencies can 
become much more transparent. 
Implications for the doctors 
Throughout most of this recall, the doctors have found" themselves 
in a precarious ethical position. They are caught between the manufac-
turer with a defective product, and patients with problems resulting 
from the device. While it appears that the majority of the patients' 
anger and legal actions are being directed at the manufacturer, some 
doctors may get caught in the fray. We can see that despite their direct 
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stakeholder relationship with Sulzer, they also need to satisfy their 
patients, who barely know Sulzer. 
Some surgeons now refuse to use Sulzer equipment, while others 
publicly blame Sulzer for the problems associated with the recall. 
Dr. Ira Kirschenbaum, a prominent orthopedic surgeon in New York 
who did not use Sulzer equipment, said that the company should have 
halted manufacturing and distribution immediately, "the minute 
somebody said we may have a problem here." Not only were the sur-
geons left in the dark, but Sulzer's own quality-assurance head was not 
informed of the problem until September of 2000 (Roser & Park, 2001). 
The Affected Patients 
Lawyers for the patients see problems ahead for the company. 
"Sulzer cost these people the first good chance," said Chad Roberts, a 
lawyer with the law firm of Spohrer, Wilner, Maxwell, and Matthews. 
"The second one's never as good. They should've done the Tylenol thing 
which is [say], 'Hey, we don't know why people are dropping dead after 
taking Tylenol, but we want you to stop buying our Tylenol'" (Park, 
2001). He referred to the 1982 incident in which seven people were killed 
by tampered with, cyanide-laced Tylenol pills. Tylenol issued a very 
quick, yet financially costly recall strategy that is often considered an 
excellent example of how to handle a product recall crisis. This is partic-
ularly worth noting considering that Johnson & Johnson (makers of 
Tylenol) is one of Sulzer's competitors in the hip replacement market. 
Tom's Relationship With Sulzer 
Though Sulzer did begin to send out e-mail updates to hip replace-
ment patients in early 2002, Tom and his family never received any 
direct, personal communication from Sulzer. These e-mails were typi-
cally a recap of what was already known about both the recall and 
the settlement initiative: When they learned new information, it was 
from the newspaper, the Internet, or their attorney. They actually know 
the names of the various reporters for the Austin American-Statesman, 
including Amy Schatz, who writes articles concerning the recall. The 
Taylors also know which Internet sites provide the most complete and 
credible medical information to help Tom with his recovery. Finally, 
despite the fact that they have never sued anyone before, the family felt 
compelled to hire an attorney to learn more about their options. 
J 
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The Taylors expected to receive their first piece of direct communi-
cation from Sulzer on March 26, 2002, since they thought it was court 
mandated; but this never occurred. Mary, Tom's wife, explains that 
Sulzer is a "non-entity" in their minds: "They have a wonderful media 
blitz going, since the public thinks we are being taken care of, but that 
could not be further from the truth." The Taylors also explained that 
the settlement proposed in the federal court for the class-action law-
suit had some significant issues that were not being publicized. The 
$200,000 per hip settlement offer includes out-of-pocket expenses and 
approximately 15% covers attorney fees. Thus, there is little left to com-
pensate for lost wages, the fact that Tom will never work again, the 
years of physical therapy ahead, and the pain and suffering experi-
enced when you learn that a piece of metal in your body is making you 
sick. Despite the fact that he can no longer work, under the terms of the 
settlement, Tom does not qualify for extra compensation, provided for 
in extreme cases, because there is no way for him to prove that the pain 
he is now suffering is a direct result of the recall issue. He believes that 
no doctor is willing to step forward to support his claim because that 
risks his or her relationship with Sulzer. 
On May 8, 2002, Judge O'Malley accepted the settlement offer in its 
final revised form. One witness testified in the final hearing that the 
agreement was "the best opportunity for the most people to recover 
the most money the soonest" (Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann, & Bernstein, 
2003). The final settlement totaled $1.035 billion, which was deposited 
into a settlement trust on November 4,2002. During this time, Sulzer 
Medicq and its subsidiary, Sulzer Orthopedic, changed their corporate 
names to Centerpulse and Centerpulse Orthopedics, respectively. It is 
expected that upon verification of claims by the claims administrator of 
the settlement, claimants in the case will have received full compensa-
tion by the middle of 2003. 
Tom and his family are unsure of what lies ahead. They were 
unaware that money had been placed in the trust or that they could see 
compensation relatively soon until the authors of this case study 
informed them of this in late January 2003. They feared that Sulzer 
would drag out the legal case as long as possible, since most of the hip 
replacement patients are over 65 years of age and will probably not live 
another 10 years. The Taylors also feared that Sulzer would simply 
declare bankruptcy, preventing any of the victims in this case from ever 
seeing compensation. They had completely lost faith in Sulzer as a 
company and are in a state of disbelief that they have never even 
--
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received an apology, and to date, no compensation for the second 
surgery has been received. 
Discussion Questions 
1. How could Sulzer have done a better job of balancing its liabil-
ity concerns with its stakeholders' need for information? 
2. Given the difficulties and constraints of this balance, did Sulzer 
act ethically? In what ways might it have used more ethical 
means of communication? 
3. With the tremendous impact that the Internet has had on infor-
mation retrieval, what potential effects might we expect from 
organizations dealing with a crisis involving multiple stake-
holders? How could an organization faced with this situation 
avoid sending conflicting messages to the various stakeholders? 
4. Using this distributed set of relationships as a guide, on which 
stakeholders did Sulzer choose to concentrate its crisis commu-
nication efforts? What suggestions do you have to improve this 
process in the future? 
Figure 6.1 Sulzer Stakeholders 
1 
j 
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5. If you were a physician needing to contact your patients and tell 
them about the recall, how would you approach this task? 
6. If you worked for Sulzer and were challenged to study this case 
and make suggestions for how future recalls should be handled, 
what would you recommend? 
.:. NOTE 
1. The Taylor family name, including the first names of Tom and Mary, are 
pseudonyms. This is at the request of the family that was interviewed . 
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